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Abstract
We develop a model that allows for a comparison of corporate
leniency programs for cartel behavior as enacted e.g. in the USA and
the EU. Although all programs are based on the idea that the ex ante
expected fine can be increased by granting fine reductions for self-
reporting firms, these programs differ considerably in how this basic
idea is legally implemented. Differences include the fine reductions
granted for first and second self-reporters, the role of the amount of
evidence provided, and the impact of whether the case is already under
investigation. We elaborate on the role of asymmetric information to
derive the optimal degree of leniency, and we apply our findings to
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1 Introduction
Legal Situation and Motivation In February 2002, the Commission of
the European Union has substantially revised its law enforcement against car-
tels initially enacted in 1996. In its attempt to ”increase the transparency and
certainty of the conditions on which any reduction of fines will be granted”
(European Union 2002, p.3), the commission introduced a leniency program
that contains two categories of fine reductions - full immunity and reduced
fines. Full immunity is granted if a firm is the first to submit evidence and
if this evidence enables the commission to find an infringement of Article
81 EC. Fine reductions below 100% are granted whenever a cartel member
provides evidence of a suspected infringement which represents significant
value added - even if it is not the first self-reporting firm.
The current regime can be seen as being in between the old European leniency
program enacted in 1996 and the one valid in the USA. The old European
system granted fine reductions contingent on the quality of evidence provided
such that first self-reporters could not be sure to get full immunity. Reports
after an investigation has started and/or after another cartel member’s re-
port were also rewarded. We will refer to this as the ”quid-pro-quo”-doctrine
as self-reporters enjoy fine reductions in exchange for evidence provision. By
contrast, the US program - originally enacted in 1978 and revised in 1993 -
grants fine reductions to the first firm submitting sufficient evidence to open
an investigation, but excludes any reductions in exchange for subsequent
reports. We will refer to this as the ”winner-takes-it-all”-doctrine as fine
reductions mainly depend on being the first self-reporter. Table 1 highlights
the crucial differences between the EU policies before/after 2002, and the
current US scheme.1
1For both programs, leniency rules only apply if some requirements are fulfilled. For
instance, the applying firm must not be the leader or initiator of the cartel and cartel
involvement must be terminated instantaneously. For details see European Community
(2002) and US Department of Justice (2004).
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US Program EU Program be-
fore 2002
EU Program af-
ter 2002
(i) First Self-
Reporter -
before investiga-
tion
Full immunity. Usually only
partial immunity
(70-100%).
Full immunity.
(ii) Dependence
on Quality of
Evidence
No.2 Yes. Only for subse-
quent reports.
(iii) Subsequent
Reports
No fine reduc-
tion.
10-50%. 20-50%.
(iv) Investi-
gation started
and author-
ity’s evidence
insufficient
Full immunity. 50-75%. Full immunity.
(v) Investigation
started and
authority gath-
ered sufficient
evidence
No fine reduc-
tions.
10-50%. 20-50%.
Table 1: Distinctive features of leniency programs.
Inspecting the differences listed in Table 1, the US-program appears rather
radical - the first self-reporting firm can get full immunity even if the case is
already under investigation, whereas a subsequently reporting firm is heavily
penalized. In short, the US program offers immunity whenever the report
is crucial to detect or convict a cartel. This policy - a reduction of the fine
for the first self-reporter and high fines for all other team members - induces
an incentive to be the first one who comes forward (often described as ”race
to the courtroom” by legal scholars and closely related to the Prisoner’s
Dilemma). If all members are identical and report, each of them will win
the race with probability 1/n, but will pay a high fine with probability n−1
n
.
Hence, reducing the fines for self-reporting firms can increase the expected
fine, and thereby deterrence.
2Evidence has to be sufficient to open an investigation.
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The European Commission developed a significantly different policy in 1996
and did also not fully adapt the US policy in 2002. The EU schemes pay
more attention to the specific facts of a case at hand - fine reductions may
be granted for all firms, and these fine reductions depend on the amount of
evidence produced, and on whether the case is already investigated. Thereby,
the heterogeneity among cartel members and the different value of their re-
ports can be taken into account, and this may help to reduce the incentive
to violate the law ex ante. Other countries like Japan offer leniency pro-
grams similar to the US, while several EU member states as Germany or the
Netherlands which enacted a program in May 2004 follow the approach taken
by the EU (or are forced to harmonize). To quite some extent this resembles
an example for the long-lasting controversy between ”rule-of-reason”- and
”per-se”-approaches in antitrust policy design.
It is an open question wether the commissions reluctance to fully adapt the
US program just displays a certain reminiscence of traditional legal princi-
ples regardless of their efficiency properties or whether the ”quid-pro-quo”-
doctrine can be justified also by a welfare analysis. The US approach seems
to have the advantage to set maximum incentives to be the first one who
provides evidence, i.e to induce maximum tension within the cartel.3 Hence,
self-reporting incentives for a given crime rate should be higher in the US
program.
In fact, the number of applications for corporate leniency grew in the US
between 1995 and 2005 by a factor of 10 and now amounts to about 40 per
year. In Europe, it also seems to be the case the law enacted in 1996 had
a positive impact on the percentage of detected cartels. Between 1996 and
1998, the average number of detected cartels per year was about 1.5, whereas
37 cases were prosecuted from 1998-2004. In almost half of these cases (18
out of 37), the European Commission had not started an investigation yet,
so that it was indeed the incentive to self-report that has led to a detection.
In 29 out of the 37 cases, at least one firm cooperated and was granted a fine
reduction. All cases until 2004 were decided according to the 1996-legislation,
i.e. the 2002-modifications have not been adopted yet. In the 39 cases, 198
firms were involved, and only for 13 firms, full immunity was granted. 18
firms received a reduction over 50%, 55 between 25 and 50%, 75 below 25%
3This is emphasized e.g. by Hammond, Director of Criminal Enforcement of the An-
titrust Division: ”If you are second, even if only by a matter of a few hours, which has
happened on a number of occasions, the second firm and all of its culpable executives will
be subject to full prosecution” (Hammond 2000, p.5).
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and 37 firms were fully penalized. There were only two cases (one in 1998
against a British sugar cartel and one in 2000 about Amino acids) where a
100%-fine reduction was not granted even though the self-reporting occurred
before the commission had started its investigation. Considering the details
of the cases4, it is very likely that the outcome would have been different
under the 2002-legislation.
As to analyze the advantages and drawbacks of the different programs, we de-
velop a model structure that allows for a comparison of ”quid-pro-quo”- and
”winner-takes-it-all”-doctrines in corporate leniency programs, and which of-
fers welfare conclusions with respect to the policies depicted in Table 1.
Relation to the literature Most basically, our analysis builds on the
self-reporting-literature in the single violator case pioneered by Kaplow and
Shavell (1994). They have shown that, if the sanction for a reported viola-
tion is infinitesimally smaller than the expected fine from being detected, all
violators prefer to self-report. The advantage is that investigation costs can
be saved as only non-reporting individuals need to be examined. Further-
more, an early detection might reduce social costs since countermeasures can
be taken right away (see Innes 1999). Innes (2000) and also Livernois and
Mc Kenna (1999) in a somewhat different context, demonstrate that only
partial self-reporting occurs if violators have different detection probabilities
ex-ante. Feess and Heesen (2002) extend the analysis to ex post asymmetric
information in the sense described above.
An important point to note is that, in the single violator case, self-reporting
always (weakly) decreases deterrence. Hence, leniency can only be optimal
if investigation costs can be saved or if an early detection is socially bene-
ficial. The situation is quite different for criminal teams, because strategic
interactions between the team members in the self-reporting stage can be
used to increase expected fines. Starting with Motta and Polo (MP2003),
there is now a growing literature on self-reporting schemes with strategic
interaction. MP2003 consider an infinitely repeated collusion game between
firms. In their model, a collusion may break down since partners may cheat
on each other (for instance by setting lower prices than agreed upon). How-
ever, a self-reporting scheme may also lead to more collusion, because low
self-reporting fines provide credible threats to reveal the collusion in case
the partner cheats. MP 2003 show that in the authority’s optimal policy,
4See cases COMP33.708 P0/British Sugar and COMP 36.545 P0/Amino Acids.
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the former effect always dominates the latter such that leniency programs
(weakly) improve social welfare. Another result (that turns out to be dif-
ferent to our findings) is that in the authority’s optimal policy no violator
self-reports before the authority investigates because there is no information
up-date between violation and self-reporting decisions.
Recent contributions such as Spagnolo (2003), Motchenkova (2004), and Har-
rington (2005) confirm that the social optimality of leniency programs is a
fairly robust theoretical result. Spagnolo (2003) shows that a ”courageous”
leniency program that rewards the first reporting party with the fines paid
by all other parties achieves a first-best. In contrast, any ”moderate” pro-
gram that reduces or cancels fines runs the risk to provide credible threats
for cartel members to unravel the deal in case the accomplice cheats. How-
ever, it is shown that a protection of reporting cartel members from fines
and inter-cartel punishments together with the enhanced risk of forming a
cartel in the presence of a leniency program may well establish advantages
that overcome this caveat of real-life leniency programs.
Motchenkova (2004) investigates the explicit implementation of leniency pro-
grams with respect to their confidentiality, the rate of law enforcement, and
the level of penalties in a timing game framework. Harrington (2005) char-
acterizes optimal leniency programs when criminal teams have different de-
tection probabilities learned after an investigation has started. The up-date
of the team-specific detection probability creates an option value of self-
reporting that reduces the deterrence effect of leniency programs. An im-
portant difference to our paper is that one self-reporting firm’s confession is
sufficient to convict the rest of the cartel so that there is neither a rationale
to offer fine reductions for subsequent reports nor to make the fine reduction
contingent on the amount of evidence provided.5 However, these two issues
are at the heart of our analysis as we want to compare ”quid-pro-quo”- and
”winner-take-it-all”-doctrines. As all papers in the literature assume that
one self-reporting firm’s confession is sufficient to convict the rest of the car-
tel and as - thus - cartel members do not differ with respect to the degree of
evidence they can provide, it only matters that an arbitrary member of the
5In fact, Harrington (2005) recognizes this shortcoming. ”... At least within the frame-
work considered here, I do not find any basis for the policy in the EU which provides
partial leniency to the second firm to come forward. Of course, such a policy could be
justified if more informants make for a stronger case which is an effect assumed away here
in that conviction occurs for sure when at least one firm joins the leniency program....
(Harrington 2005, p. 19 f.)
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cartel comes forward. The evidence he provides is as useful as anyone else’s
report. Moreover, a subsequent report - in turn - does not come with any
benefit.
That firms may actually differ in the degree of evidence they can provide
about their counterparts has been recognized e.g. in Aubert, Kovacic and
Rey (2005). They investigate the agency problem associated with a whistle-
blowing program where employees are rewarded if they transmit evidence
about their employer’s cartel activity. Moreover, they regard hard evidence
as a threat to other cartel members and use this to explain why firms do
not destroy hard evidence of cartel activity. As Aubert et al. (2005) assume
that firms are identical with respect to their costs (and profits), the amount
of evidence they keep in equilibrium turns out to be the same. However, it
is easy to see that their model would predict heterogenous evidence holdings
once firms differ with respect to costs or profits.
In order to compare ”quid-pro-quo”- and ”winner-takes-it-all”-doctrines, we
need to go beyond the literature by combining two ingredients: first, firms
need to be heterogenous with respect to the amount of evidence provided.
Second, there has to be an information up-date after the violation in order
to analyze whether fine reductions should be different before and after an
investigation has been started. This inevitably leads to a game with two
self-reporting stages and asymmetric information with respect to criminal
benefits and detection probabilities. We will analyze the simplest framework
that exhibits these properties.
Framework To offer a transparent model that includes heterogeneous firms
and lets more informants make a stronger case, we assume that there are only
two firms which agree upon collusive behavior whenever their team-benefit
is (weakly) above their aggregated expected fines.6 The following ingredients
are required to distinguish between existing programs:
(a) The two members of the team differ with respect to the degree of evidence
they can provide about their accomplice. This assumption is necessary to
account for part (i) and (ii) of the programs described In Table 1.
(b) There are two self-reporting stages: A criminal may self-report before his
case is detected, or after he has been detected, but not yet convicted. This
6Qualitatively, our results would not change if we assumed instead that each member
of the team must weakly benefit from collusion. Implicitly, our assumption allows for side
payments ex ante.
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distinction is important for two reasons: first, it is required to compare parts
(iv) and (v) of the two programs. Second, it will turn out that the strategic
interactions between the two criminals differ considerably in the two stages.
While the pre-detection stage seems to be best described as a race to the
courtroom, the second stage is simply the classical prisoner’s dilemma.
(c) If the authorities were perfectly informed, then the task of designing an
optimal self-reporting scheme would be trivial. Obviously, the court should
assign the maximum self-reporting fine to the first self-reporter that only
just ensures self-reporting with certainty, and impose the maximum fine to
the other firm(s). This would lead both to a self-reporting frequency of
100 percent and to maximum deterrence. To be realistic (and to analyze
part (iii)), we need to introduce some kind of asymmetric information. In
our model, the probability of being detected does not only depend on the
authority’s investigation effort, but also on team-specific attributes (”types”)
that are private information to the violators. We assume that these types
are learned only after a violation has been committed, (see the previous
section on ex post asymmetric information). For instance, the team might
learn after the violation that it has acted careless in some sense, or that a
(potential) new market entrant will not be willing to join the cartel. Since
self-reporting occurs only if the type-specific detection probability is known
to be high, the possibility to self-report leads to an option value that ceteris
paribus reduces the expected fine to be paid. As already discussed in the
literature review, this disadvantage of leniency programs has only recently
been taken into account in the economic literature but seems to be important
to understand why a full immunity for the first self-reporting firm may not
come without costs. Furthermore, the two self-reporting opportunities are
not based on the same information set which introduces a non-trivial relation
between pre-detection stage and conviction stage.
To maintain analytical tractability, we restrict ourselves to a static framework
in the sense that firms decide once (at the beginning of the game) wether to
collude or not. Moreover, benefits from crime are assumed to be sunk. While
such a model appears inappropriate to draw conclusions with respect to the
optimal level of fine reductions, it will turn out to be sufficient to highlight
the relevant dynamics regarding the optimal fine structure (i.e. the relation
between evidence quality and fine reductions which is at the heart of any
comparison between ”quid-pro-quo”- and ”winner-takes-it-all” doctrines.)
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the
model. Following backwards induction, section 3 analyzes equilibrium strate-
8
gies (including the authority’s optimal policy). Section 4 discusses merits and
shortcomings of the model and draws conclusions with respect to existing le-
niency programs.
2 The Model
In our model, there are two firms H and L which form a cartel whenever their
team benefit B is above the aggregated expected fine denoted F . B is private
information and distributed with continuous density g(B). The difference
between H and L refers to the amount of evidence that can be provided
about the partner if a firm self-reports. Specifically, we assume that if firm
H (L) self-reports, than firm L (H) can be convicted with probability h (l)
where h > l. This covers feature (a) as discussed in the introduction. Types
H and L are common knowledge. If the team does not self-report, the case
is detected with probability pθ where p ∈ (0, 1) is the percentage of cases
investigated, and θ ∈ (0, 1) is a team specific parameter distributed with
continuous density z(θ). θ is only learned by the team after the violation
decision and is private information (see feature (c)).
If the case is detected, however, the amount of evidence is not necessarily
sufficient to actually convict the team which happens only with probability
t ∈ (0, 1). After detection, violators face a second self-reporting opportunity.
For simplicity, we assume that if a violator self-reports, the authority relies
on the evidence provided and does not engage in further investigation.7 Fur-
thermore, we assume that l > t (as self-reporting would otherwise reduce the
conviction probability which would not make sense) and that both p and t
are exogenously given. 8
The maximum fine the authority can impose is denoted s. Clearly, this fine
has to be paid by those violators who are convicted either due to the accom-
plices report or the governments effort, not convicted violators, however, do
not pay anything. Hence, the authority is left with the assignment of fines
for convicted violators for all types (H,L) and self-reporting opportunities
(before and after detection) depending on wether they have self-reported or
7Instead, we could define τ as the additional evidence provided by self-reporting, and
then derive l as l = τ + t− tτ > t.
8This has the technical advantage that the authority minimizes social costs simply by
maximizing the expected fine F . It can be shown that our qualitative results carry over
to endogenous monitoring (see Feess and Walzl (2003)).
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are convicted (both due to the evidence provided by a team member or the
effort spent by the authority). The game considered can now be described
as follows:
• Stage 1. (”Authority’s policy”): Authority commits to a vector R of
(self-reporting) fines (i.e. assigns fines to every final node of the game
tree where a violator is indeed convicted).
• Stage 2. Nature determines and individuals learn their private benefits
B from cartel behavior.
• Stage 3. (”Violation decision”): Individuals decide upon violating the
law (i.e. forming a criminal team if B ≥ F ).
• Stage 4. Nature determines and violators learn their team-specific de-
tection probability θ.
• Stage 5. (”Pre-detection stage”): Violators decide separately and non-
cooperatively upon self-reporting.
• Stage 6. Non-reported cases are detected with probability pθ.
• Stage 7. (”Conviction stage”): Violators decide separately and non-
cooperatively upon self-reporting.
• Stage 8. Detected, but non-reported cases lead to conviction with prob-
ability t.
In the following, we will derive (the) subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE)
of the game considered by backwards induction. Thereby, we can restrict
attention to stages 1, 3, 5 and 7 as all other stages are either nature’s moves
or part of the authority’s policy committed to in stage 1. With respect
to stage 1, recall that the authority’s objective is to reduce the number of
criminal acts given by pi =
∫ B
eB=F
g(B)dB where B˜ is the borderline type who
only just violates. Hence, the authority only has to maximize expected fines
F . Furthermore, stage 3 is obviously a simple decision problem as both B and
F are known by the potential violators is stage 3. The self-reporting decisions
in stage 5 and 7 result in non-cooperative stage-games between the members
of the criminal team. We will discuss these games in detail in the next
section. In general, these games will prove to have multiple equilibria (in pure
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strategies). As equilibrium selection criterion, we assume throughout that
the team plays the (pure strategy) Nash Equilibrium (NE) that minimizes
their aggregated expected fines (Kaldor-Hicks dominance). In fact, all of our
conclusions would otherwise be reinforced, because the Kaldor-Hicks criterion
selects an equilibrium that minimizes the deterrence of the self-reporting
scheme, so that the policy will prove (even) more successful when using
other equilibrium selection concepts. Furthermore, we assume without loss
of generality that every individual self-reports in case of indifference.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
3.1 Conviction stage (stage 7)
We can now start with the self-reporting decision in stage 7 under the as-
sumption that the team has been detected (note that stage 7 will not be
reached if the team has not been detected, or if a member has already self-
reported). As team members are interrogated separately, let us define cki ,
i = H,L; k = 1, 2 as he self-reporting fine in the conviction stage if the cartel
member i self-reports, and if there are k self-reporters (i.e. the fines imposed
on player i explicitly depend on his self-reporting decision and on the action
of his counterpart). The respective normal form game for the members of
the criminal team is depicted in table 2 (where the first fine refers to the
row-player H):9
ScL N
c
L
ScH c
2
H/c
2
L c
1
H/hs
N cH ls/c
1
L ts/ts
Table 2: Expected fines in the conviction stage
If both self-report, they pay fines c2H and c
2
L, respectively. If only type L(H)
comes forward, he pays c1L(H) and the evidence provided leads to conviction
of the counterpart (and maximum payments of s) with probability h or l, re-
spectively. If no-one self-reports, the game enters stage 8 and hence expected
fines are ts. When turning to the authority’s optimal policy in stage 1, we
9The team member’s actions at this stage are given by Xci with i = H,L and X ∈
{S,N} where X = S if a player self-reports and X = N if he does not come forward
(superscript c denotes the conviction stage.).
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will demonstrate that in the SPE, there is a unique NE in stage 7, and we
define f ci , i = H,L as the respective expected individual fines. No decisions
are to be made in stage 6, so that we can directly proceed to stage 5.
3.2 Pre-detection stage (stage 5)
We can now turn to the self-reporting decision before the team has been
detected. There is an important difference to the situation in the convic-
tion stage. In the conviction stage, both members of the cartel are already
known and can be interrogated separately. Hence, the authority can impose
different self-reporting fines depending on the accomplice’s behavior, i.e. to
differentiate between c1i and c
2
i . In the pre-detection stage, this is not possi-
ble, because, even if both want to self-report, only one can win the race to
the courtroom (see e.g. the comment made by US-official Hammond quoted
above). Hence, team member’s action S now refers to the attempt to self-
report. Assuming that each of them wins the race to the courtroom with
equal probability of 0.5, this leads to the expected fine structure shown in
table 3.10
SdL N
d
L
SdH
1
2
(rH + ls) /
1
2
(rL + hs) rH/hs
NdH ls/rL pθf
c
H/pθf
c
L
Table 3: Expected fines in the pre-detection stage
In Table 3, ri, i = H,L is the self-reporting fine in the pre-detection stage,
and f ci is the expected fine for detected violators. If only one, H, say, wants
to self-report, he pays fine rH . His accomplice will then be convicted with
probability h and pays in this case the maximum fine s. This explains the
expected outcome in the
(
SdH/N
d
L
)
-action combination, and analogously in
the
(
NdH/S
d
L
)
-action combination. If both want to self-report, each of them
pays his self-reporting fine ri in case he wins. Otherwise, he is convicted by
the partner’s evidence with probability l or h, respectively, which explains
the expected outcome in the
(
SdH/S
d
L
)
-combination. If none of them self-
reports, the team is detected with probability pθ. The game then enters
stage 7, which leads to expected fines of f ci as explained above.
10The team member’s actions at this stage are given by Xdi with i = H,L and X ∈
{S,N} as defined above (superscript d denotes the (pre-)detection stage).
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To analyze possible equilibria, first note that
(
NdH , N
d
L
)
is a NE if and only if
ri > pθf
c
i ∀i. Hence, player i deviates from
(
NdH , N
d
L
)
if θ ≥ ri
pfci
. Depending
on ri and on f
c
i (and hence on the authority’s policy), we have
rH
pfcH
≶ rL
pfcL
.
To exclude the action-profile
(
NHd , N
L
d
)
as a (potential) NE, it suffices that
θ ≥ θ̂ ≡ min
(
rH
pfcH
, rL
pfcL
)
. Throughout the paper we will refer to the type of
player who destroys the (NHd , N
L
d )-NE as the pivotal player - more formally:
Definition 1. Player i ∈ {H,L} is pivotal for (NHd , NLd ) being a NE if
ri
pfci
<
rj 6=i
pfcj 6=i
.
Then, we can describe the possible equilibria as follows:
• Case 1: θ < θ̂: Then, (NdH , NdL) is a NE.
• Case 2: rH
pfcH
≤ θ < rL
pfcL
. In this case,
(
NdH , N
d
L
)
is no NE as player H
has an incentive to self-report (SdH) (i.e. H is pivotal in the sense of De-
finition 1). Then, (SdH , S
d
L) is a NE if
1
2
(rL + hs) ≤ hs or, equivalently,
if rL ≤ hs. Otherwise, (SdH , NdL) is a NE.
• Case 3: rL
pfcL
≤ θ < rH
pfcH
. In this case,
(
NdH , N
d
L
)
is no NE as player L
is pivotal and has an incentive to self-report (SdL). Then, (S
d
H , S
d
L) if
rH ≤ ls. Otherwise, (NdH , SdL) is a NE.
The distinction between cases 1-3 will be used when deriving the authority’s
optimal policy. In stage 4, the violators learn their team-specific component
θ of the detection probability θp. In stage 3, they from a cartel if their joint
benefit B is weakly above their (joint) expected fine F . In stage 2, violators
learn B. Hence, we can directly turn to the authority’s optimal policy.
3.3 The Authority’s Optimal Policy
Fine Structure in the Conviction Stage Since a violation takes place
whenever B ≥ F , the authority maximizes the expected aggregated fine F for
any t and p given assigning the self-reporting schemeR = (rH , rL, c
1
H , c
1
L, c
2
H , c
2
L).
With respect to the fines imposed in stage 7, we get
Lemma 1. (i) In the authority’s optimal policy mini=H,L (c
1
i ) ≤ ts, c2H = ls
and c2L = hs. (ii) When the conviction stage is reached, both violators self-
report with probability one, and the expected individual fines are f cH = ls and
f cL = hs, respectively.
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Proof. Recall that we adopt Kaldor-Hicks dominance as equilibrium selection
criterion in case of multiple equilibria. If N c ≡ (N cH , N cL) is implemented as
equilibrium, then the individual fine is f ci (N
c) = ts ∀i ∈ {H,L}. To destroy
the N c-equilibrium, the authority has to set mini=H,L (c
1
i ) ≤ ts. This given,
Sc ≡ ScH/ScL is the unique NE if c2H ≤ ls and c2L ≤ hs hold, so that imposing
c2H = ls and c
2
L = hs is optimal. Aggregated fines are then F
c(Sc) = s(l+h).
If c2H > ls or c
2
L > hs, then the asymmetric decisions S
c
H/N
c
L and S
c
L/N
c
H
become NE, leading to maximum aggregated fines F c(ScH/N
c
L) = hs+ ts and
F c(ScL/N
c
H) = ls+ ts, respectively (for higher fines, N
c will be played). From
t < l, it follows that F c(·) is maximized if the authority induces self-reporting
by both parties, which allows for maximum fines hs and ls, respectively. 
The intuition for Lemma 1 follows immediately from the fact that, in the
conviction stage, the authority can resemble the prisoner’s dilemma by dif-
ferentiating fines according to the accomplice’s behavior. By setting either
c1H or c
1
L (weakly) smaller than ts, it is ensured that N
c ≡ (N cH , N cL) can be
no NE. This given, the authority prefers to implement Sc ≡ (ScH/ScL) as the
unique NE in stage 7, because the fines if only one self-reports need to be
low to destroy N c as a potential NE. And since the maximum fines which
support Sc as a NE are c2H = ls and c
2
L = hs, the Lemma follows.
Fine Structure in the Pre-Detection Stage Determining the optimal
fine structure in the pre-detection stage turns out to be more complicated.
However, the following two insights are helpful: First, we know from the
conviction stage that f cH = ls and f
c
L = hs if the conviction stage is reached
(see Lemma 1). This allows us to re-write table 3 as
SdL N
d
L
SdH
1
2
(rH + ls) /
1
2
(rL + hs) rH/hs
NdH ls/rL pθls/pθhs
Table 4: Sub-game perfect expected fines in the pre-detection stage.
which will be easier to handle. Second, the only way to eliminate the Nd ≡(
NdH , N
d
L
)
with certainty is to set rH = rL = 0 as we have otherwise a θ small
enough such that θ < θ̂ = min
(
rH
pfcH
, rL
pfcL
)
. This given, the authority has to
make the following three decisions:
• Decision 1: It has to decide whether player H or player L shall be
pivotal in destroying the Nd equilibrium. Since we already know that
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f cH = ls and f
c
L = hs, it follows that player H will be pivotal if and
only if rH
pls
< rL
phs
which can be simplified as rH
l
< rL
h
.11 Note that this
implies that player L is pivotal if rH = rL as l < h as he faces higher
expected fines in case of conviction.
• Decision 2: Once a pivotal player (i, say) has been chosen the au-
thority faces the following trade-off: the lower ri, the higher the prob-
ability that the unwarranted non-reporting situation N c is no Nash
Equilibrium. But on the other hand, the lower ri, the lower is ceteris
paribus the expected aggregated fine F in case self-reporting occurs.
This trade-off determines ri.
• Decision 3: The self-reporting fine for the non-pivotal player (j, say)
rj will then determine whether Sd or an asymmetric equilibrium will
be played in case that Nd is no NE.
To solve the problem, let us assume for the moment that player H is pivotal,
i.e. that rH
l
< rL
h
. Then, (SdH , N
d
L) is an NE if and only if rL > hs, otherwise
Sd is a NE.12 If the authority prefers the Sd-NE, it will clearly set rL = hs,
i.e. the maximum fine that only just supports (SdH , S
d
L) as an equilibrium.
Inspecting Table 3 above shows that the aggregated expected fine in Sd is thus
F (Sd) = 1
2
(rH + ls)+
1
2
(rL + hs) =
1
2
(rH + ls)+
1
2
(hs+ hs) = 1
2
(rH + ls)+
hs. On the other hand, for any rL > hs, the aggregated expected fine in the
(SdH , N
d
L)-NE is F (S
d
H , N
d
L) = rH + hs (see again Table 3). Comparing the
two outcomes shows that
F (Sd)− F (SdH , NdL) =
1
2
(rH + ls) + hs− (rH + hs) = 1
2
(ls− rH) > 0
where ls − 1
2
rH > 0 follows from the assumption that player H is pivotal.
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Hence, if the authority chooses the fines such that player H is pivotal, either
Sd or Nd, but no equilibria where only one wants to self-report are possible
in the authority’s optimal policy.
Analogously, we can show that F (Sd) − F (NdH , SdL) > 0 so that we can
summarize our results as follows.
11Note that this simplification was not possible in section 3 because fcH = ls and f
c
L = hs,
which is part of the authority’s optimal policy in stage 1, had to be derived before.
12Keep in mind that this NE will only be played if θ < θˆ as otherwise (NdH , N
d
L) is
chosen.
13From rHpls <
rL
phs together with rL = hs we get rH < ls.
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Lemma 2. (i) If H is pivotal, then rL = hs. (ii) If L is pivotal, then,
rH = ls. (iii) In Stage 5, the NE for the stage game is S
d = (SdH , S
d
L) if
θ > θ̂ and Nd = (NdH , N
d
L) otherwise.
Proof. Part (i). Has been proven above. Part (ii). Proceeds analogously.
Part (iii). Is implied by (i) and (ii). 
The reason for Lemma 2 is that the incentive to self-report is higher when the
partner self-reports, because the probability of being convicted then increases
from θph or θpl to h and l, respectively. Hence, implementing Sd instead
of an equilibrium where only one self-reports allows higher fines without
establishing Nd as NE. Hence, we are left with the question which player
will be pivotal in the authority’s optimal policy (i.e. rH
l
< rL
h
or not). Our
findings with respect to this are summarized in
Lemma 3. In the authority’s optimal policy, the high evidence provider H
is pivotal, i.e. rH
l
< rL
h
.
Proof. Assume for the moment that player L were pivotal. Recall that
rH = ls in this case (see Lemma 2). Define r
∗
L as the optimal rL if L
were pivotal, so that the borderline type θ˜L who only just self-reports would
be given by θ˜L =
r∗L
phs
. Taking Lemma 2 into account, it follows that the
aggregated expected fine if L were pivotal is given by14 (see Table 4)
F ∗L =
(
1
2
(r∗L + hs) + ls
)∫ 1
eθL
z(θ)dθ + p (h+ l) s
∫
eθL
0
θz(θ)dθ (1)
Now assume that player H is pivotal and assume that the authority sub-
optimally chooses rH such that θ˜L = θ˜H which requires
rH
l
=
r∗L
h
. Then, the
expected aggregated fine amounts analogously to
FH =
(
1
2
(rH + ls) + hs
)∫ 1
eθL
z(θ)dθ + p (h+ l) s
∫
eθL
0
θz(θ)dθ (2)
where rH =
lr∗L
h
yields
FH =
(
1
2
(
lr∗L
h
+ ls
)
+ hs
)∫ 1
eθL
z(θ)dθ + p (h+ l) s
∫
eθL
0
θz(θ)dθ. (3)
14F ∗L (F
∗
H) denotes the maximum (and hence optimal) aggregated expected fine the
authority can implement if player L (H) is pivotal.
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It follows that
FH − F ∗L =
1
2
∫ 1
eθL
z(θ)dθ
(
s (h− l)− r∗L
(
h− l
h
)]
> 0 (4)
which always holds as rL < hs because
(
SdH , S
d
L
)
would otherwise be no NE.
And by definition of optimality, it follows that F ∗H ≥ FH > F ∗L. 
The fact that the high evidence provider H in general gets a substantial
fine reduction and will (hence) be pivotal in the authority’s optimal policy
is not trivial because there are countervailing effects. On the one hand, if
H is pivotal, the equilibrium fine assigned to his counterpart (rL = hs) is
higher than for a pivotal L (which only results in rH = ls). This clearly
increases expected (aggregated) fines. On the other hand, if H is pivotal,
the unwarranted Nd-action combination is (ceteris paribus) more often an
equilibrium (as r
hs
< r
ls
) because it is more costly to induce self-reporting
by H who is difficult to be convicted with L’s testimony. This obviously
constitutes a disadvantage. However, as shown in the proof to Lemma 3, the
first effect always dominates. Then, taking the three Lemmata together, we
can summarize the authority’s optimal policy in
Proposition 1. In the authority’s optimal policy, (i) c2H = ls and c
2
L = hs.
(ii) rL = hs. (iii) rH = argmaxrHFH(
.). (iv) rH < ls. (v) A sufficient
condition for rH > 0 is that z(θ) satisfies z(0) = 0. (vi) A sufficient condition
for rH = 0 is that z
′(θ) ≤ 0.
Proof. Part (i). See Lemma 1. Part (ii). See Lemma 2 and Lemma 3. Part
(iii) The authority chooses rH as to maximize expected fines
FH =
(
1
2
(rH + ls) + hs
)∫ 1
eθH
z(θ)dθ + p(h+ l)s
∫
eθH
0
θz(θ)dθ
where the optimization program that implicitly defines r∗H is given in the
Appendix. Part (iv) Note that rH = ls can never be optimal, as
∂FH
∂rH
= 0
and ∂
2FH
∂(rH)2
> 0 at rH = ls. Part (v). A sufficient condition for rH ∈ (0, 1)
is z(0) = 0 as this implies that ∂F
∂rH
> 0 for rH = 0. Part (vi). A sufficient
condition for rH = 0 is z
′(θ) ≤ 0 as this implies that ∂2FH
∂(rH)2
> 0 ∀rH ∈ (0, ls)
which excludes an interior solution. 
Part (i), which is already known from Lemma 1 says that if the team is
detected without having self-reported, then the fines are equal to the max-
imum fine s, weighted with the probability that one can be convicted by
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the partner’s testimony. Part (ii) expresses that the low evidence provider L
pays the same fine hs if he self-reports already in the pre-detection stage, so
that he does not benefit from self-reporting at all. Conversely, the high evi-
dence provider H’s fine for early self-reporting - implicitly given by ∂FH
∂rH
= 0
(see Part (iii)) - is strictly lower than his fine for a report in the conviction
stage where rH < ls is ensured by the fact that type H is pivotal. Parts
(iv) and (v) of the Proposition refer to the question whether a full amnesty
should be granted to the high evidence provider if he confesses already in the
pre-detection stage. As expressed in the Proposition, this depends on the
distribution over the team-specific detection probability θ. z(0) = 0 ensures
that all violators know that they will be detected with positive probability,
so that a full amnesty cannot be optimal as even positive fines ensure full
self-reporting. On the other hand, a decreasing density (z′(θ) ≤ 0) means
that there is a large number of violators that will only come forward if a full
amnesty is granted. However, full immunity can never be optimal for type
L who will pay rL = hs if he wins the race to the courtroom, which holds
regardless of the density function z(θ). These sufficient conditions carry over
to the dynamic setting investigated in Harrington (2005) (see Theorem 2
therein).
Comparative Statics An important point with respect to the analysis
of existing programs is how the self-reporting fines depend on the evidence
provided. We summarize our results as follows.
Corollary 1. (i)
dc2H
dh
=
dc2L
dl
= 0. (ii)
dc2H
dl
=
dc2L
dh
= s > 0. (iii) drL
dh
= s > 0.
(iv) drL
dl
= 0 (v)drH
dh
< 0. (vi) drH
dl
> 0.
proof: see appendix.
In the conviction stage, the equilibrium fines are c2H = ls and c
2
L = hs, so
that the self-reporting fines are independent of the own evidence provided,
but are increasing in the evidence provided by the partner. The reason is that
the fines are chosen such that both types only just self-report, and the own
incentive to self-report is (for t and s given) a monotone increasing function
of the conviction probability if the partner self-reports.
In the pre-detection stage, we have rL = hs, so that the fine for the low-
evidence provider is again independent of his own evidence, and increasing
in the evidence provided by his accomplice. Both results follow intuitively
from the fact that type H is pivotal for the self-reporting decision, so that
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type L’s self-reporting fine is independent of whether he reports before or
after the team has been detected.
The fact that type H’s self-reporting fine is decreasing in his evidence pro-
vided (drH
dh
< 0) follows from the fact that his testimony is more valuable if h
is high. The higher h, the higher is type L’s expected fine hs if H self-reports,
which will hence be made more attractive by reducing rH . The higher l, how-
ever, the higher is ceteris paribus type H’s incentive to self-report, because
his expected fine when the team is detected without having self-reported in-
creases (recall that c2H = ls). Stated differently, if l increases, a higher rH
can be chosen without destroying H’s self-reporting incentive. Hence, the
pivotal type’s fine depends (non-trivially) on the evidence provided by both
types.
4 Discussion
Significance of assumptions In this section, we will first review the plau-
sibility and the significance of our assumptions. Together with our findings,
this will finally enable us to draw some conclusions for the existing leniency
programs.
First, to analyze cartel behavior, a repeated game seems a natural assump-
tion (see Motta and Polo (MP1999), Spagnolo (2003), or Harrington (2005)).
Key aspects of repeated interactions are (1) that the team has some future
benefits if it is not detected, (2) that collusive profits grow over time such
that damages in case of detection increase, and (3) that the environment (law
enforcement, industry characteristics etc.) may change. Because of heteroge-
nous firms, two self reporting stages and ex post asymmetric information, we
needed to restrict attention to a static framework. However, it is important
to discuss the relevance of the points (1) - (3) analyzed in dynamic settings
for our findings.
In a static framework, the first two aspects could be in principle modelled
in a reduced form by assuming that B is non-sunk. Then, without ex post
asymmetric information, the optimal self-reporting fine would be negative
(i.e. a self-reporting firm would be subsidized) to induce full self-reporting.
This is exactly what is concluded in Spagnolo (2003). However, assuming
that B is non-sunk would lead to serious complications in our model without
going far beyond the existing literature and the results presented in this
paper. The problem is that both the violation decision and the self-reporting
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decision in the first self-reporting stage would then depend on B, so that the
authority would have to update its initial information after self-reporting has
taken place. This would lead to a signaling game that requires a cumbersome
analysis in a model with asymmetric information on θ, with two self-reporting
stages and with different degrees of evidence provided. As these elements of
our model are essential for a comparison of the programs, and because there
is no reason to believe that a dynamic setting alters the results qualitatively,
we follow the mainstream of the self-reporting literature by assuming that B
is sunk.
Changing environments (point (3) above) are most naturally analyzed in a
stopping game framework as in Motchenkova (2004). Though technically
involved, this approach seems to be most appropriate to analyze optimal fine
levels over the live cycle of a cartel as the maximum fine (s) can then be
endogenized and should depend on the aggregated collusive profits. Results
concerning the optimal fine structure, however, should not be altered by these
effects. Hence, our model does not provide point recommendations of fine
reductions for a given environment but tries to illuminate the comparative
statics of fine reductions with respect to evidence provision and the date of
report submission (which is exactly where existing programs mostly differ).
In this sense we provide a complementary approach to the existing literature.
Second, one might question that the detection probability p and the convic-
tion probability t are exogenously given. In reality, p and t reflect how much
effort is spent in law enforcement, and are hence choice variables. We analyze
endogenous p and t in a working paper (Feess and Walzl (2003)). In the con-
viction stage, the result will then be that the authority sets min (c1i ) = 0 in
order to ensure full self-reporting even for t → 0 which follows simply from
the prisoner’s dilemma structure in the conviction stage. In the detection
stage, the optimal p is derived analogously to rH , but this does not lead to
economically interesting insights. Hence, treating p and t exogenous seems
to be justified for ease of exposition.
Third, one might wonder why we introduce ex post asymmetric information
with respect to θ. Of course, some kind of asymmetric information (besides
the benefit B) is necessary to introduce partial self-reporting (i.e. a non-
trivial relation between different self-reporting stages). However, one might
ask why we do not assume that θ is already known ex ante (as assumed
by Innes (1999) for the single violator case). Modelling ex post asymmetric
information has three advantages: first, it seems realistic that the cartel gets
new (private) information after the collusion has started. Second, knowing
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θ ex ante means that the violation decision depends on a vector of private
signals (on B and θ) which drives the analysis more cumbersome, while,
third, ex-ante asymmetric information implies that the team knows right
from the beginning whether it self-reports which neglects the option value of
a leniency program and, as a consequence, biases the analysis.
Fourth, we restrict the problem of private information to the benefits and
to the detection probability, and do not extend it to the conviction stage
by introducing an individual component of the conviction probability (like θ
in the pre-detection stage). However, asymmetric information in the second
stage would not alter the result at all, because one could still implement
self-reporting as a dominant action by setting min (c1i ) = 0.
Fifth, we implicitly allow for cooperative behavior in the violation stage by
assuming that only aggregated fines and benefits matter for the violation
decision. Conversely, we assume non-cooperative behavior in the two self-
reporting stages. Non-cooperative behavior in the violation stage would lead
to less offenses, since both individual expected fines would need to be above
the individual benefit. But this would not change the optimal scheme qualita-
tively, while the analysis of the violation decision becomes more cumbersome.
If, on the other hand, all teams behave cooperatively in the self-reporting
stage, then we are back in the single violator case (i.e. we loose the spe-
cial appeal of leniency programs to exploit the strategic interaction between
criminals).
Sixth, our first self-reporting stage is characterized as a race to the courtroom,
while the second one is a prisoner’s dilemma. Deterrence could considerably
be increased if the pre-detection stage could also be designed as a prisoner’s
dilemma by assigning low fines for a single self-reporter, but high fines if
both self-report. Self-reporting of both members would then require to de-
fine a time window (of two or three days, say) where self-reporting would
be interpreted as ”simultaneous self-reporting”. Although tempting from a
theoretical viewpoint, legal scholars convinced us that making the fine for
a self-reporter in the pre-detection stage contingent on whether the second
one self reports or not is legally unacceptable and impracticable, while such a
practice is quite common in the conviction stage (i.e. once potential violators
are interrogated separately).
Conclusions for leniency programs At a very general level, our analy-
sis confirms that self reporting schemes for criminal teams are much more
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promising than those for single violators. Since strategic interactions be-
tween team members can be used to increase expected fines and to reduce
the frequency of violations, leniency is part of the authority’s optimal policy
even without any additional benefit from self-reporting like cost savings or
early countermeasures. Hence, we emphasize that these programs should be
extended to other fields. In Germany, for instance, all attempts to implement
leniency programs for corruption have yet failed according to legal and moral
considerations. Incentive arguments, however, are hardly taken into account.
Let us now get back to the five characteristics of corporate leniency programs
in the US and the EU identified in the Introduction.
• Ad (i). In the US and in the new EU scheme, the first self-reporting
firm always gets full immunity if some requirements are fulfilled, and if
self-reporting occurs already in the pre-detection stage. In our model,
full immunity can never be optimal for the low evidence provider. For
the high evidence provider, it depends on z(θ), and hence on the case
at hand, whether full amnesty is optimal or not. As a consequence,
always granting a full fine reduction is suboptimal. The optimal scheme
imposes more incentives to report on the high evidence provider as his
report is more valuable. This result somewhat questions the changes
in the EU program.
• Ad (ii). In the pre 2002 EU-program, it is explicitly stated that fine
reductions increase in the amount of evidence provided, while the 2002
modifications restrict this to fine reductions granted for reports after an
investigation has started or other reports have already been submitted.
Our findings are somewhat more subtle. In the conviction stage, both
fines do not depend on the own evidence provided, but only on the
probability of being convicted by the partner’s testimony (this is driven
by the prisoner’s dilemma structure of the conviction stage). This is
also true for the low evidence provider L in the pre-detection stage.
For the high evidence provider H, however, we find indeed that his
fine should be decreasing in his own evidence provision. In any case,
we conclude that the fine structure should not be independent of the
quality of evidence which supports the ”quid-pro-quo”-doctrine.
• Ad (iii). In the model presented, we did not explicitly analyze what
happens with one violator, L say, if the other one (H) has self-reported.
Then, L can be convicted with probability h and pays fine s. Of course,
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whenever convicting L with probability h requires some investigation
effort (which is likely to be the case), it would again be optimal to offer
a self-reporting fine of ls to induce self-reporting by the second team
member. This makes the extensive form of the game somewhat more
complicated and has thus only been considered in the companion paper
Feess and Walzl (2003). But following the logic of the model, a corner
solution where no fine reduction is granted for a second self-reporter is
clearly suboptimal.
• Ad (iv) and (v). Finally, full immunity can be granted in the USA
and the new EU scheme also if the case is already under investigation.
According to our model, the old EU-approach where the maximum fine
reduction is limited, has some appeal, since the fines in the conviction
stage should be higher than in the pre-detection stage for the one who
provides more evidence. In contrast to both leniency programs, we find
that the fine for the one who provides less evidence (type L) should be
the same in both self-reporting stages (cL2 = r
L). The reason is that
it is unwarranted that type L wins the race to the courtroom, which
explains the high fine rL = hs.
It should, however, be kept in mind that the dynamic nature of collusion
induces a certain bias of our analysis towards higher fines. Hence, our results
do not question the optimality of courageous leniency programs as in Spag-
nolo (2003) or the optimality of full immunity for firms submitting reports
that directly lead to a conviction of other cartel members as in Harrington
(2005). The evidence dependence of optimal fine reductions as discussed in
our model is rather a complementary result to these findings that sheds light
on details where existing programs actually differ.
In sum, our model shows the limits of the winner-take-all approach followed
by the US authority and somewhat adapted by the EU commission in 2002,
and highlights the impact of heterogeneity among cartel members with re-
spect to the evidence they can provide about on the optimal fine structure.
Moreover, we have shown how the nature of the strategic interaction between
members of the criminal team (i.e. the differences between races to the court
room and prisoner’s dilemma situations) influences the optimal enforcement
scheme. Both features seem to be underdeveloped in the design of existing
leniency programs.
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Appendix
Optimization Program. With
FH =
(
1
2
(rH + ls) + hs
)∫ 1
eθH
z(θ)dθ + p(h+ l)s
∫
eθH
0
θz(θ)dθ
it follows that
∂FH
∂rH
=
z(θ˜H)
pls
(
1
2
rH − 1
2
ls+ rH
h
l
− hs
)
+
1
2
∫ 1
eθH
z(θ)dθ
∂2FH
∂(rH)2
=
z′(θ˜H)
pls
(
1
2
rH − 1
2
ls+ rH
h
l
− hs
)
+
z(θ˜H)
2pls
+
z(θ˜H)
pls
(
1
2
+
h
l
)
Note that the term in brackets is negative. Necessary and sufficient conditions
for rH ∈ (0, ls) is ∂FH∂rH = 0 and
∂2FH
∂r2H
< 0, respectively.
Proof of Corollary 1. (i)-(iv) obvious. (v) Comparative statics of rH
w.r.t. h and l are given by
drH
di
= −∂
2FH/∂rH∂i
∂2FH/∂r2H
∀i = H,L
where the second order condition requires ∂
2FH
∂r2H
< 0 for every interior solution.
To prove (v) note that
∂2FH
∂rH∂h
=
z(θ˜H)
pls
(rH
l
− s
)
< 0
(recall that rH < ls).
As for (vi), observe that the first term in
∂2FH
∂rH∂l
= −z
′(θ˜H)rH
(pls)2l
(
1
2
rH − 1
2
ls+ rH
h
l
− hs
)
−z(θ˜H)
pl2s
(
1
2
rH − 1
2
ls+ rH
h
l
− hs
)
+
z(θ˜H)
pls
(
rHh
l2
− s
2
)
+
1
2
z(θ˜H)
rH
pl2s
(5)
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can be approximated using the second order condition
(
∂2FH
∂r2H
< 0
)
such that
the sign of Eqn. (5) can be determined by
∂2FH
∂rH∂l
>
z(θ˜H)h
pl2
(1 + p) > 0
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